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Abstract
This report is an effort to address information gaps 
regarding how gendered claims are addressed by adjudi-
cators at Canada’s Refugee Protection Division of the 
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (the RPD) . It 
looks at one specific type of gendered claim: persecution 
through domestic or intimate violence . The study consid-
ers all the RPD decisions from 2004 to 2009 and judi-
cial reviews from 2005 to 2009 that were reported in the 
Quicklaw LexisNexis service . These decisions are analyzed 
both quantitatively and qualitatively .
This report finds adjudicators consistently identify domes-
tic violence as a form of gendered persecution that can form 
a nexus to a convention ground . However, despite contrary 
directions from the Gender Guidelines, adjudicators often 
fail to recognize the social, cultural, economic, and psycho-
logical dynamics of domestic abuse as legally relevant for 
their assessment of state protection . There is a striking failure 
on this account when it comes to determining if it was reason-
able to expect the claimant to seek state protection .
This report presents data on factors such as the rates at 
which adjudicators consider the adequacy of women’s shel-
ters and the responsiveness of local police to complaints . As 
well as identifying the frequency and grounds for which judi-
cial reviews are granted, this report also presents a series of 
recommendations for reform . These recommendations iden-
tify where studies are needed, how the Gender Guidelines 
need reform to make them a helpful instrument, and how 
training and support for PRD adjudicators needs to be 
enhanced .
Abstract
Le présent article tente de combler des lacunes documen-
taires tenant à la façon dont les juges de la Section de la pro-
tection des réfugiés (SPR) à la Commission de l’immigration 
et du statut de réfugié du Canada traitent les revendications 
genrées . Un type particulier de revendication genrée est exa-
miné : la persécution par la violence domestique ou conjugale . 
L’étude considère l’ensemble des décisions de la SPR de 2004 
à 2009 et des commentaires judiciaires de 2005 à 2009 signa-
lés dans le service LexisNexis Quicklaw . Ces décisions sont 
analysées à la fois quantitativement et qualitativement . Il est 
constaté que les juges identifient systématiquement la violence 
domestique comme forme de persécution genrée, y trouvant 
motif à s’appuyer sur la Convention . Cependant, malgré les 
instructions contraires que renferment les directives sur le 
genre, les juges omettent souvent de reconnaître la dynamique 
sociale, culturelle, économique et psychologique de la violence 
conjugale comme juridiquement pertinente pour leur évalua-
tion de la protection de l’État . Il y a un échec frappant à cet 
égard quand il s’agit de déterminer s’il eût été raisonnable de 
s’attendre que le demandeur d’asile cherche la protection de 
l’État . L’auteure présente des données sur des facteurs tels que 
la fréquence à laquelle les juges considèrent le caractère adé-
quat des refuges pour femmes et l’aptitude de la police locale 
à réagir aux plaintes . Tout en identifiant la fréquence et les 
motifs pour lesquels les contrôles judiciaires sont accordés, 
l’auteure présente une série de recommandations en vue d’une 
réforme . Ces recommandations indiquent où des études sont 
nécessaires, comment réformer les directives sur le genre pour 
en faire un instrument utile et comment la formation et le sou-
tien des juges de la SPR doivent être renforcés .
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Introduction and Overview of Findings
This report presents disturbing findings about how the 
refugee claims of women fleeing domestic violence are 
treated by adjudicators at the Immigration and Refugee 
Board of Canada . Although the Minister of Citizenship 
and Immigration is required to report to Parliament on the 
gendered impact of the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act, very little—if any—information has been synthesized 
and made public on this issue . The study underlying this 
report was designed to begin to fill this information gap—
and the data presented in this report indicates that reform 
is urgently needed .
From 2004 to 2009 there were a total of 135 decisions 
by adjudicators of the Refugee Protection Division of the 
Immigration and Refugee Board (“RPD”) that were reported 
in the LexisNexis Quicklaw service where a woman sought 
protection from spousal violence . Three of those women 
were granted refuge . One hundred thirty-two claimants 
were rejected . The majority of these women were rejected on 
the basis that they had failed to rebut the presumption that 
their home state could protect them .
This report takes a quantitative and qualitative look at 
these decisions, with a particular emphasis on decisions that 
turned on state protection . It shows that RPD adjudicators 
are inconsistent in their adherence to the Gender Guidelines 
that were drafted by the Chairperson of the Immigration 
and Refugee Board (IRB) to guide the decision-making 
process when gender-based claims are made . There is some 
tendency to de-gender domestic violence claims by treating 
them like other cases of private criminality . In particular, 
adjudicators often fail to meaningfully engage with the com-
plex social, cultural, and economic dynamics that impact 
on how victims of domestic violence are able to seek state 
protection . This puts the defensibility of these decisions into 
doubt . It raises questions about whether women are being 
returned to violence .
These findings are supported by the divergence between 
the factors the Gender Guidelines indicate RPD adjudicators 
are to take into account, and the factors which RPD adjudi-
cators seem to treat as relevant in their decisions . These 
findings are also supported by the judicial reviews reported 
in this area . For the period of 2005 to 2009, a stunning 44 
per cent of judicial review applications of decisions reported 
in LexisNexis Quicklaw where a woman was fleeing domes-
tic violence from a spouse or ex-spouse were allowed by the 
Federal Court .2 The majority of these decisions turned on 
finding that the RPD adjudicator’s conclusion—that the 
woman’s state could protect her—was not reasonable .
A successful judicial review application does not mean 
that a claim will ultimately be accepted on its merits: it 
only results in the claim being sent back to the RPD for a 
rehearing . However, it is evident that decisions are not being 
made properly, and so current practices are likely placing 
women at serious risk of being returned to violence and per-
haps death at the hands of their prior spouses .
This report makes many recommendations to try to 
bring the decision-making practices of RPD adjudicators 
into line with Canada’s mandate to protect . It specifically 
calls upon the IRB to aggressively revisit their training prac-
tices with RPD adjudicators for hearing gendered claims, for 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) itself to finally 
engage in a substantive review of the gendered impacts of 
protection decisions, and for the Gender Guidelines to be 
revised to provide more direction to RPD adjudicators in 
several problem areas .
Context and Scope of Study
Background: The Debate on How Best to Address 
Gendered Persecution (a Journey from Rapt  
Attention to Quiet Neglect)
Canada is a signatory to many international human rights 
instruments, including the 1951 Refugee Convention3 and 
the 1967 Refugee Protocol .4 The Refugee Convention con-
tains a definition of “refugees .” It defines them as persons 
who are outside of their state of nationality (or residency) 
and who have a well-founded fear of being persecuted on 
the basis of five enumerated grounds . These five grounds are 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, and political opinion . The feared persecution must 
leave the person unable or unwilling to seek protection from 
their state of nationality . This definition is coupled with an 
obligation—that signatory states are not to return “refu-
gees” to the state where they face such persecution . Refugee 
protection is thus a surrogate level of protection, extended 
when a citizen is not protected by their home state .
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Chart 1: Overall acceptance rates by the Refugee 




*Decisions reported in LexisNexis Quicklaw, 2004–2009 (as of 
April 2009) .
Chart 1: Overall acceptance rates by the Refugee 
Protection Division for claims based on domestic 
violence (2004–2009)*
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This definition of “refugee,” where protection is only 
offered if the persecution is linked to one of the five enum-
erated grounds, has long been acknowledged as incomplete . 
The incompleteness arises because it does not fully repre-
sent Canadian values and understandings of fundamen-
tal human rights . Canadians and Canadian law reject the 
legitimacy of targeting or leaving people vulnerable to harm 
based upon more than these five grounds; we also reject 
such targeting on the basis of grounds such as gender, age, 
and sexual orientation .
The potential gap between the definition of refugee and 
Canadian understandings of the fundamental human rights 
of women was identified as a problem by refugee adjudica-
tors shortly after Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board 
(IRB) was established in 1989 . Canada was not alone in iden-
tifying this problem . Since at least 1985, the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has been 
urging states to recognize that women may be persecuted 
on the basis of gender, and that such women deserve the 
protection of the international community .5 To further this 
objective, UNHCR released guidelines in 1991 that illus-
trated how the definition of “refugee” in international law 
could embrace gender-based persecution .
Canada struck committees in the early 1990s which 
were to study the issue and recommend a course of action .6 
Although major legislative reform of Canada’s immigration 
and refugee regime was pending, and a fresh set of laws was 
to be passed in 1994, Canada chose not to revise its defin-
ition of refugees to explicitly recognize “gender” as a ground 
of persecution for which protection may be offered . Instead 
it was decided that the Chairperson of the IRB would exer-
cise her statutory authority7 and issue guidelines to direct 
adjudicators hearing refugee claims where the persecution 
is gender-related . This decision was inconsistent with the 
positions that Canada has taken in other contexts, where 
we have voluntarily and proudly explicitly bound ourselves 
by law to protecting women against wrongful treatment on 
the basis of their gender . For example, this commitment is 
reflected within the terms of our constitution and in both 
federal and provincial laws .8 But in the context of refugee 
claimants, Canada, like the UNHCR, relies upon guidelines 
that indicate how existing laws can be interpreted to extend 
to women who suffer gendered persecution .9
These Guidelines were first issued in 1993, and then revised 
in 1996 .10 They were carefully drafted to sensitize adjudica-
tors to how women may experience persecution in ways that 
differ from men, and to illustrate how such persecution may 
fall under the refugee definition . The Guidelines state:
Although gender is not specifically enumerated as one of the 
grounds for establishing Convention refugee status, the definition 
of Convention refugee may properly be interpreted as providing 
protection for women who demonstrate a well-founded fear of 
gender-related persecution by reason of any one, or a combination 
of, the enumerated grounds . (Emphasis added .)
The Guidelines address such issues as how to determine 
whether there is the necessary link between the gendered 
persecution and an enumerated ground, evidentiary issues 
that may arise in gendered claims, and other unique diffi-
culties that may come up in the context of hearing a gen-
dered claim . The Guidelines also describe three broad cat-
egories of situations where gendered persecution may arise . 
These include situations where women are persecuted due 
to their family relations (e .g ., where the political opinions of 
other family members may be imputed to them, or they may 
be targeted as a route for getting at their family members), 
where women experience violence or severe discrimination 
due to their gender and their state does not or will not pro-
tect them, and where women are targeted due to failure to 
conform to “gender-discriminating religious or customary 
laws or practices .”11
The then Chairperson of the IRB explained the decision 
to pursue guidelines, and not enact law, as reflecting the fact 
that “changing the definition unilaterally is a serious public 
policy issue” which “Canadians had to deal with in more 
depth .”12 This explanation suggests that the Guidelines 
were a potentially interim measure, pending more expan-
sive consultations and analysis, and did not represent the 
end of the discussion on how Canada could best address 
claims involving allegations of gendered-based persecution . 
However, as discussed below, it does not appear that CIC 
has commissioned any substantive studies to help inform 
such conversations .
In late 1993 the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed 
that the enumerated ground of “membership in a particular 
social group” included groups defined by “gender .”13 One 
would have thought that this decision from the Supreme 
Court of Canada, coupled with the Guidelines, would 
together result in “gender” effectively operating as a sixth 
ground of persecution . However, many subsequent com-
mentators have not found this to be the case . Instead, schol-
ars have found that decision-makers sometimes struggle to 
make a plausible link between what they identify as gender-
based persecution and the five enumerated grounds .14
The year 1994 was not the last time that Canada revisited 
its refugee legislation . There have been other instances 
when it would have been appropriate—and responsible—
for Canada to have considered how the Guidelines were 
operationalized, and to rewrite either the Guidelines and/
or the legislation . Another major overhaul was undertaken 
in the late 1990s, leading up to the current statute, the 
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2001 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act15 (IRPA) . The 
National Association of Women and the Law (NAWL) sub-
mitted a brief to the Standing Committee on Citizenship 
and Immigration in which they made a series of recom-
mendations about IRPA when it was in Bill form .16 One of 
their recommendations read in part as follows: “We recom-
mend that the refugee definition be amended to formally 
include gender in its own right, or as part of a larger open 
ended list of social groups .”17 This recommendation was 
not adopted . There is no suggestion that the decision to reject 
this recommendation was based on empirical research, an 
analysis of the Guidelines, or any other study into the opera-
tive outcomes and decisional processes of Canada’s current 
approach to gendered claims . In these circumstances, the 
rejection of the proposal appears to have been arbitrary, 
or driven by factors other than an assessment of whether 
or how the Guidelines work, of whether or how we are 
returning women to persecution . Canada’s neglectful 
approach to this area is further evidenced by the IRB hav-
ing announced in 2002 that it would review the Guidelines 
in light of the changes brought about under IRPA, to assess 
whether it required modifications .18 This review, however, 
appears to have never been performed, as there is no sign of 
it on CIC or the IRB’s website . So we refused to change the 
law, while apparently completely failing to assess whether 
or not the law worked .
Citizenship and Immigration Canada does not appear 
to have ever followed up with an assessment of its decision 
to enact Guidelines, or to have otherwise analyzed the role 
the Guidelines play in decisions . Nor have the Guidelines 
been revised since 1996 . This continuing gap in research 
and analysis exists despite the fact that there is a statutory 
obligation on the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration 
to report on such matters . In particular, the Minister is 
required by law to provide Parliament with a “gender based 
analysis” of the impact of Canada’s immigration and refu-
gee legislation on an annual basis .19
Although CIC does generate its annual reports, the 
reports are very general . They present little in terms of data 
or analysis on refugee claimaints .20 For example, the only 
data regarding refugees included in the 2009 Annual Report 
to Parliament21 are bar charts comparing permanent resi-
dents by immigrant class and sex from 2004 to 2008 . From 
these charts we learn that of all men accepted as permanent 
residents from 2004 to 2008, 13 per cent became permanent 
residents due to obtaining some sort of “protected persons” 
status, and that of all women who became permanent resi-
dents, 11 .5 per cent were landed within a “protected persons” 
category . The presentation of this minimal data does not 
constitute “a gender-based analysis of the impact of this Act” 
on women refugee claimants .
The 2009 Annual Report does refer to several studies 
of Canada’s refugee resettlement programs which include 
gender-based considerations . These are obviously important 
research projects which are essential for determining how 
to best support the long-term success of woman refugees 
who are settled in Canada . However, these studies are fun-
damentally about how Canada develops its internal policies, 
not about the gendered impact of the Act itself . It is this later 
issue which must, according to statute, be analyzed . Based 
on the Annual Reports, it is unclear whether CIC is under-
taking any substantive empirically-based analytic work on 
the gendered-impacts of IRPA . Calls to address this gap—of 
data and analysis of the data—have been made before . The 
most comprehensive and specific arguments are to be found 
in the 2006 Status of Women report entitled Gendering 
Canada’s Refugee Process .22
It defies reason that CIC has interpreted its obligation 
to provide a “gender based analysis” of the impact of the 
Act as not including an analysis of gender-based claims . It 
is baffling that CIC has not reported on whether omitting 
“gender” from the legislation as a ground of persecution has 
had consequences for protecting women from persecution . 
This failure to report undermines Canada’s ability to know 
whether we have made the right decisions, or whether we 
need to make fundamental changes . It undermines Canada’s 
ability to know whether or how the RPD uses the Guidelines, 
and whether, in fact, the Guidelines adequately address and 
provide directions on the issues that arise in claims of gen-
dered persecution . Although this report seeks to provide 
some information on these issues, it is no substitute for CIC 
fulfilling its obligations and certainly does not address the 
breadth of issues which require investigation .
Recommendation: That CIC fulfill its statutory obligation under 
IRPA s .94(2)(f) to include “a gender-based analysis of the impact 
of the Act” in its annual report to Parliament .
Recommendation: That CIC specifically perform a “gender-based 
analysis of the impact of the Act” on gender-based claims .
Whatever momentum was present in 1993, that led 
Canada to seriously consider how to best align Canadian 
values and approaches to fundamental human rights with 
the fact that women were seeking shelter from gendered 
persecution, appears to have been lost . The operating policy 
assumption must be that the Guidelines are effective, that 
the issue of how to adjudicate claims of gendered persecu-
tion no longer merits any concern . This report finds that this 
assumption is in error . It concludes that the Guidelines are 
often not being followed, and that many decisions are being 
made without proper regard to the social, cultural, eco-
nomic, and policing context in which claimants may live . 
The failure to engage with the relevance of these contextual 
factors effectively de-genders the decision-making process . 
It has particularly strong consequences for assessments of 
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whether the woman claimant acted reasonably in either not 
seeking police protection or not continuing to seek police 
protection in the face of having had her complaint dis-
regarded by police officials .
Although policy and lawmakers have seemingly aban-
doned these issues, scholars have not . The merits of the 
Canadian government’s decision to use non-binding guide-
lines, and to not enact laws, and the general question of how 
gendered claims are adjudicated, have been and continue to 
be the topic of considerable discussion .23 Core critiques of 
Canada’s current approach are that it trivializes gendered 
persecution, and makes the pervasiveness of gendered per-
secution invisible, and that anything less than legislation 
may be ineffective .24 The core argument against making a 
legislative amendment, and instead continuing to work with 
just Guidelines, is that the legislation can already be, and is, 
read to include gender-based persecution—so there is sim-
ply no need to change anything .25 A secondary argument 
is more concerned with the enumerated ground approach 
being inherently problematic because a list will always 
exclude many vulnerable groups . So the solution is either 
to abandon enumerated grounds altogether, or to argue for 
“women” being “a particular social group,” thus creating pre-
cedents for interpreting this enumerated ground as encom-
passing persecution based on analogous grounds such as 
“age, sexual orientation, disability, etc .”26 These debates are, 
however, largely going on within a data vacuum, and would 
clearly benefit from information on how gender-based 
claims are being actually adjudicated . And, as noted above, 
there is very little information on this issue .
Recommendation: That CIC ensure all studies or reports which 
it produces that collect data or analyze gendered impacts be easily 
accessible by members of the public .
Data and Sample Set for Study
This study seeks to identify trends in decision making based 
primarily upon an empirical review . It is intended to pro-
vide baseline information on trends, as well as an initial 
analysis of those trends . A goal was to make it possible to 
begin to have an informed debate about how claims of gen-
dered persecution are decided .
There are obviously many areas which require analyses 
of their gendered impacts, such as the experiences of sex-
ual minorities within the claims process . However, this 
report does not set out to provide a comprehensive review 
of gendered claims . It only considers how refugee claims 
brought by women who flee alleged intimate or domestic 
violence from their spouse or ex-spouse have been adjudi-
cated . This topic of analysis was selected because intimate 
violence has been identified as a “paradigmatic example” of 
gender specific abuse27 which is also “the most prevalent 
yet relatively hidden and ignored forms of violence against 
women .”28
The core data for this study is decisions by the Refugee 
Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board . 
RPD adjudicators are the front-line decision makers who 
make the initial—and often only—assessment of a refugee 
claim . It is therefore essential to understand how the RPD 
adjudicates gender-based claims .
This study is limited to those decisions that were reported 
in the LexisNexis Quicklaw database . LexisNexis Quicklaw 
does not report all decisions of the RPD, but it does include 
a pool of decisions that is considerably larger than those 
which CIC posts in RefLex, their public and searchable 
online database . LexisNexis Quicklaw was searched for all 
decisions of the RPD that were reported as delivered in the 
years 2004 to 2009 (as of April 2010) . The search terms were 
“domestic violence” and “intimate violence .” The results of 
this initial search were then vetted on a case-by-case basis . 
Only decisions where the alleged persecution involved 
acts of violence committed against women by persons 
with whom they have or had an intimate spousal relation-
ship were kept (i .e ., all decisions where a person targeted a 
woman because she refused to start a relationship with that 
person, or where the violence was at the hands of another 
family member such as a father, were omitted) . Although 
domestic violence may arise in many types of intimate or 
familial relationships, and men are also victims of domes-
tic violence, these limits were put upon the decisions used 
for this report to try to minimize variables .) Ultimately, 
the total number of RPD decisions which were kept for the 
study was 135 . As it turned out, all of the decisions involved 
heterosexual spousal relationships .
This study also drew upon some data which was pro-
duced pursuant to a Pro Bono Students Canada project for 
the Women’s Legal Education Action Fund (LEAF) on judi-
cial review assessments of RPD decisions involving domes-
tic violence claims .29 These decisions were identified by 
the students in a similar fashion: the LexisNexis Quicklaw 
database for Federal Court Trial Division decisions was 
searched for decisions which included the three terms 
“refugee,” “gender,” and “domestic violence .” The pro bono 
students then reviewed the cases, eliminated those which 
were not domestic violence claims brought by women, and 
created brief summaries of key aspects of those decisions . 
This report draws upon some of their summary materi-
als, for cases reported between 2005 and 2009 as of April 
2010 . The total number of cases is 89 . The report author 
also reviewed all of the decisions where the judicial review 
was noted as allowed, to ensure that only reviews of RPD 
decisions involving spousal violence against women were 
included, and to extract relevant data . A list of all RPD and 
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judicial review decisions that were reviewed can be found 
with the full version of this report that is posted at http://
www .nawl .ca .
Research Findings and Observations
The Big Picture: 98 Per Cent of Domestic Violence Cases 
Are Rejected by the RPD
As noted above, a total of 135 RPD decisions were reviewed . 
The expectation of the report author was that the decisions 
would demonstrate considerable variation in outcomes, 
reflecting facts such as the individual circumstances of 
woman claimants and the varying levels of social, cultural, 
policing or legal tolerance for domestic violence in different 
states . Instead they were essentially uniform .
Of the 135 decisions that were reviewed, 132 were rejected . 
This is a rejection rate of 98 per cent . However, in the years 
2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 the rejection rate was 100 per 
cent—no claims that were reported in LexisNexis Quicklaw 
were accepted by the RPD . The breakdown by year is pro-
vided in Chart 2 .





2009 2 1 1
2008 9 0 9
2007 21 0 21
2006 23 0 23
2005 30 0 30
2004 50 2† 48
Total 135 3 132
 * Claims reported in LexisNexis Quicklaw, 2004–2009 (as of 
April 2010) .
† In [2004] RPDD No . 131, the adjudicator found there was no 
objectively founded future risk of persecution . However, the 
claim was accepted under the “compelling reasons” exception 
(IRPA s .108(4)) .
Claims were denied most often because the woman claim-
ant failed to convince the adjudicator that her home state 
could not protect her from her abuser (64 per cent) . The 
second most common ground was that the claimant’s story 
of having suffered from domestic violence was not found to 
be credible by the adjudicator (34 per cent) . Other grounds 
included finding the claimant had an internal flight alterna-
tive30 (11 per cent), that the claimant’s delay in seeking pro-
tection was found to mean that they did not actually fear 









































Chart 3: Grounds for declining claims in 132
RPD decisions (2004-2009)*
* Some claims were denied on multiple grounds . In those cases, 
all grounds for denying the claim were recorded on this chart, 
and so the columns do not add up to 132 . Data reflects RPD 
claims reported in LexisNexis Quicklaw, 2004–2009 (as of April 
2010) .
Chart 3: Grounds for declining claims in 132 RPD 
decisions (2004–20 9)*
was not established (0 .7 per cent) . The grounds for declining 
claims—by the actual number of times the ground arose—
are set out in Chart 3 .
These decisions—that women were lying about their 
experience, or else that their state could in fact protect 
them—paint a picture that contradicts the trends identified 
by international bodies who study violence against women . 
For example, the United Nations General Assembly’s 2006 
assessment was that the “most common form of violence 
experienced by women globally is intimate partner vio-
lence”31 and that “it is clear that violence against women 
remains a devastating reality in all parts of the world, and 
the implementation of international and regional standards 
to eradicate such violence is therefore an urgent priority .”32 
The UN essentially identifies domestic violence as a world-
wide crisis that is being perpetuated by the failure of states 
to take effective action .
As a result of finding that their states could protect them 
from domestic violence, in the reviewed cases the RPD 
rejected individual woman claimants (and any accom-
panying children) over the last six years from: Bangladesh, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Costa Rica, France, 
Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, 
Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Korea, Lithuania, Mexico, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Philippines, Portugal, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, 
Trinidad and Tobago, and the Ukraine . The United Nations 
has collected survey data from fourteen of these twenty-eight 
countries on domestic abuse . They found that the reported 
rates of women experiencing domestic violence are 40–47 
per cent in Bangadesh, 27–35 per cent in Brazil, 25–26 per 
cent in Chile, 15 per cent in China, 9 per cent in France, 23 
per cent in Germany, 10 per cent in Honduras, 32 per cent in 
Israel, 20 .7 per cent in Korea, 42 per cent in Lithuania, 17–27 
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per cent in Mexico, 31 per cent in Namibia, 10–21 per cent 
in the Philippines, and 19 per cent in the Ukraine .33
The rates at which the RPD rejects claims on the basis 
that the woman’s home state can protect her seem to make 
little sense in the face of this data on the general inability 
of these states to prevent the victimization of women by 
their spousal partners . It is hard to understand how a state 
could be considered to protect women if suffering spousal 
violence is a statistically common event . And, the Federal 
Court has found that RPD decisions were not reasonable, or 
otherwise could not stand, in 44 per cent of the decisions 
they reviewed from 2005 to 2009 .34 (This data is presented 
below .) This all raises questions about how decisions are 
being made .
This report now turns to trying to understand “the big 
picture .” It presents more detailed information on trends 
and patterns in RPD adjudications of domestic violence 
claims, to identify what factors or evidence are taken as 
relevant and having weight . It also compares these trends 
to the directions in the Gender Guidelines . Although the 
report author had expected that the bulk of this study would 
consist of comparing positive and negative determinations, 
such a comparison would not be meaningful given that 
there were only three reported cases in the years under 
review where women were recognized as refugees . The 
report therefore focuses almost exclusively on the trends 
in negative determinations . Although some positive trends 
are identified, many are disturbing and suggest that Canada 
may be wrongfully returning women to danger .
Figuring Out What the Big Picture Means: Trends  
and Patterns in Adjudication
Trend: Domestic Violence Is Consistently Recognized  
as a Form of Persecution That May Found a Claim  
for Refugee Protection
One positive trend in the cases is that domestic violence is 
consistently recognized as a form of persecution that may 
found a refugee claim . This is consistent with the directions 
in the Guidelines . In their discussion of how an adjudicator 
ought to assess whether a feared harm constitutes persecu-
tion, the Guidelines direct that violence—“including sexual 
and domestic violence”—constitutes persecution when it is 
“a serious violation of a fundamental human right .”
The survey of RPD decisions revealed no cases where 
the claim was denied on the basis that the alleged domes-
tic violence did not constitute persecution . (See Chart 3 .) 
When it came to the question of persecution, if the adjudi-
cator believed the claimant’s story, the adjudicator either 
described the violence which the woman had experienced, 
or simply asserted that the claimant had suffered from 
domestic violence, and then moved on to other steps of 
the analysis . This could suggest that the adjudicators have 
thoroughly understood and embraced the fact that domestic 
violence is always a violation of fundamental human rights, 
and therefore constitutes persecution . This outcome is an 
extremely positive one to document . It suggests that domes-
tic violence—like forced prostitution, or state-sanctioned 
rape—has passed the conceptual threshold where its repug-
nance to fundamental human rights could still be debated .
The matter that appears to remain problematic for 
adjudicators, however, is what is required of states for them 
to be found to protect their citizens specifically from domes-
tic violence . From the decisions of the RPD and judicial 
reviews from the Federal Court that were reviewed for this 
report (and which are discussed below), it is apparent that 
RPD adjudicators sometimes conflate the fact that protect-
ive legislation exists, or that police are undergoing gender-
sensitivity training, with the conclusion that the legislation 
or training is in fact effective . Adjudicators’ understandings 
must go from recognizing that domestic violence is repug-
nant to human rights, to recognizing that these rights con-
tinue to be violated for the purposes of human rights law 
until a state has taken meaningful steps to prevent its occur-
rence (and reoccurrence) .
A secondary point is that all of the reviewed cases 
involved physical violence . The Guidelines do not expressly 
contemplate non-physical manifestations of domestic vio-
lence . This leaves a potential gap between the Guideline 
directions and contemporary human rights norms . As 
observed in a 2006 UN study of violence against women, in 
light of international human rights instruments, domestic 
violence is recognized as embracing a range of coercive acts 
which include sexual, psychological, and economic violence . 
The UN defines psychological violence as including “con-
trolling or isolating the woman,” and defines economic vio-
lence as including “denying a woman access to and control 
over basic resources .”35 The RPD’s likely treatment of claims 
involving these forms of domestic violence is unknown . 
Given the emphasis in the Guidelines on physical violence, 
however, there is the potential for these other types of vio-
lence to not be recognized by an adjudicator as also being 
potential violations of fundamental human rights .
Recommendation: The IRB revise the Gender Guidelines to 
explicitly reflect contemporary human rights norms that define 
domestic violence as including sexual, physical, psychological, 
and economic violence .
Trend: RPD Assessments of State Protection Seldom Follow 
the Gender Guidelines’ Directions
The Law on State Protection . As noted above, the reviewed 
intimate violence cases did not turn on whether the alleged 
domestic violence counted as persecution . They largely 
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turned on a different aspect of the refugee definition . In 
particular, most turned on whether the claimant’s home 
state is “unable” or “unwilling” to protect them . If their 
home state can protect them, then the claim is declined, 
as refugee protection is intended to be a form of surrogate 
protection . According to the Supreme Court of Canada, if a 
state has a functioning government, then it is presumed to 
be able to protect its citizens from private persecutors . As a 
result it falls on the claimant to rebut this presumption by 
presenting “clear and convincing” evidence of their state’s 
unwillingness or inability to protect .36 Where the persecu-
tion is at the hands of a private party—such as a spouse—the 
claimant is usually required to prove that they made efforts 
to seek protection from their home state, but that the pro-
tection “did not materialize .”37 This obligation on a claim-
ant to have sought state protection only arises “in situa-
tions in which state protection ‘might reasonably have been 
forthcoming’”38 and not when all that could be obtained is 
“ineffective protection .”39
As well as receiving direct testimony from the claim-
ant as to their experiences, adjudicators are provided with 
“country reports” to assist them in their assessment of 
state protection . These documents are compiled by a var-
iety of governmental and non-governmental sources . For 
example, country reports are produced by the IRB and the 
United States Department of State, as well as by Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch . Country reports 
are drawn upon as information sources for matters that may 
be relevant for assessing refugee claims, such as whether 
and how allegations of police misconduct are addressed, 
whether there are laws in place that criminalize spousal vio-
lence, and conviction rates .
The Directions from the Guidelines on State Protection Do Not 
Seem to Play a Significant Role in Adjudicator Assessments . 
The Guidelines provide considerable elaboration on how to 
assess state protection in the context of gendered persecu-
tion . They flag a series of four factors that are relevant for 
determining whether the exception arises and it was rea-
sonable for the claimant to not seek state protection . The 
Guidelines state:
… when considering whether it is objectively unreasonable for 
the claimant not to have sought the protection of the state, the 
decision maker should consider, among other relevant factors, 
the social, cultural, religious and economic context in which the 
claimant finds herself .
The Guidelines similarly flag these contextual factors, as 
well as laws, as relevant for determining whether or not a 
claimant’s home state can protect her . In particular, they 
require that in assessing state protection, “[t]he social, cul-
tural, traditional and religious norms and the laws affecting 
women” ought to be assessed “by reference to human rights 
instruments which provide a framework of international 
standards for recognizing the protection needs of women .” 
In other words, human rights instruments are to be used 
to identify the standards for assessing state protection of 
women . The Guidelines cite eight international instruments 
for adjudicators to draw upon . These are the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights; International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights; International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women; 
Convention on the Political Rights of Women; Convention 
on the Nationality of Married Women; Convention Against 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment; and Declaration on the Elimination of 
Violence Against Women .
Based on the cases reviewed for this report, these direc-
tions have not been followed with any consistency by the 
Refugee Protection Board in its negative decisions that 
turned on state protection . Instead:
•	 protection standards from human rights instruments 
do not seem to inform decision-making;
•	 RPD adjudicators often seem to be selective in their 
assessment of protective legislation and policing sup-
port—while weight is always given to evidence that 
the state can protect, weight seldom seems to be given 
to contrary evidence;
•	 RPD adjudicators do not appear to treat social or cul-
tural factors as relevant for determining whether it 
was reasonable for the woman to seek state protection; 
and
•	 Economic and religious factors do not appear to be 
taken meaningfully into account in determining if 
it was reasonable for the woman to not seek police 
intervention .
The evidence for these findings, and related ones, is dis-
cussed below .
Protection Standards from Human Rights Instruments Do 
Not Seem to Inform Decision Making . In the negative deci-
sions that were reviewed, international human rights instru-
ments were not used to identify standards or thresholds for 
protecting women . This constitutes a failure to follow the 
Gender Guidelines . The pragmatic result of this is the likely 
failure of adjudicators to appreciate the distinct character of 
women’s protection needs when their persecution is based 
in gendered discrimination .
Of the eighty-six claims where the presumption of state 
protection was not rebutted, only four sets of reasons 
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were identified as referring to international human rights 
instruments .40
In two of these cases the adjudicator observed that rel-
evant human rights instruments had been ratified . The 
adjudicator did not, however, consider whether the states 
had implemented their obligations . The implication seems 
to be that the fact of signing such instruments means that 
the state should be deemed safe . In a third decision the 
adjudicator concluded that, as the woman’s home state 
had signed the treaty on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women, one could presume domestic compliance 
and implementation .
These are dangerous leaps of logic . They may be reason-
able assumptions to make in the case of treaty obligations 
generally, but the data shows that such an assumption is not 
reasonable in the case of treaty obligations to protect women . 
The United Nations and treaty monitoring bodies have 
documented the all-too-common gap between states com-
mitting to protect women from violence, and actually mak-
ing good on those commitments .
Implementation of international standards at the national level 
remains inadequate, as evidenced by the continuing prevalence 
of violence against women worldwide . Human rights treaty bod-
ies regularly draw attention to gaps in the implementation of 
international obligations relating to violence against women . The 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against women 
has consistently identified a number of areas of concern, as have 
other human rights treaty bodies .41
In only one case did the adjudicator consider reports by 
treaty bodies on compliance . Here the adjudicator found 
that commentators were concerned that many treaty 
obligations had not been met . However, the adjudicator 
nonetheless found that the presumption of state protection 
was not rebutted .
Recommendation: The IRB ensure that RPD adjudicators are 
provided with reports from human rights treaty bodies on state 
compliance with their treaty obligations to protect women .
RPD Adjudicators Tend to Only Partially Assess the Impact of 
Domestic Laws on Women Seeking Protection from Domestic 
Violence . The Gender Guidelines clearly call on adjudica-
tors to consider whether there are laws that protect women 
from domestic violence . In most decisions, adjudicators did 
take note of whether protective legislation existed (86 per 
cent) . However, in most cases this was the end of the analy-
sis . Adjudicators only commented upon the effectiveness of 
such laws in 29 of the 86 cases . (See Chart 5 .) This is a serious 
problem . It may usually be reasonable to assume that, if a state 
enacts protective laws, such laws will be enforced . However, 
this assumption is not a reasonable one to make in the case of 
domestic violence laws . In many states women have suffered 
and continue to suffer from deeply ingrained patterns of dis-
crimination as well as cultural or social norms which tolerate 
violence against them, and which undermine the effectiveness 
of legislation . Once again, the United Nations has documented 
the persistent gap between enactment and the effective imple-
mentation of laws that protect women from domestic violence 
in many states .42 Further inquiry is always required .
The Gender Guidelines are sensitive to this issue . As noted 
above they refer to human rights instruments to identify the 
standards for women’s protection needs . These instruments 
are clear that women are only protected if laws are effective .
One of these instruments is the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women . 
Article 3(c) of the convention requires the establishment of 
“legal protection of the rights of women” and “the effective 
protection of women against any act of discrimination .”
Another instrument which decision makers are directed 
to for the standard for women’s protection needs is the 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women . 
Article 4(d) requires states to develop domestic legislation 
which provides “just and effective remedies for the harms” 
suffered by women who are subjected to violence .
These instruments indicate that state protection is only 
present where there are effective state responses . The proper 
threshold, then, if the Guidelines are followed and domes-
tic violence claims are not to be de-gendered, is to inquire 
into the effectiveness of state measures, not merely to assess 
whether measures exist in law . This requires assessing state 
legislation on an operational scale . If laws are not enforced, 
or are ineffective or inaccessible due to requirements such 
as there being an independent witness to the violence, then 
women are not in fact protected by their states .
82
4
Chart 4: RPD references to internaonal 
human rights instruments* (2004-2009)
Makes no reference to human 
rights instruments
Refers to state having signed a 
human rights treaty
*Data reflects claims reported in LexisNexis Quicklaw 2004–
2009 (as of April 2010) where the claim was rejected on grounds 
including the presumption of state protection not being rebutted . 
(N=86 .)
Chart 4: RPD references to international human 
rights instruments (2004–2009)*
155
Domestic Violence and Gender-Based Persecution
Recommendation: The IRB revise the Gender Guidelines to 
describe the thresholds for protecting women that are identified 
in the international human rights instruments that are referred 
to in the Guidelines . At a minimum, that the Guidelines should 
incorporate the standard from the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women that the state pro-
vide “effective protection” and “just and effective remedies .”
Recommendation: The IRB ensure RPD adjudicators are trained 
to interpret and apply the standards from the international human 
rights instruments that are referred to in the Gender Guidelines to 
assessments of state protection of women .
Recommendation: The IRB enhance their training programs for 
RPD adjudicators to ensure that adjudicators are sensitive to the 
distinctions in assessments of state protection between claims 
where the persecutor is a spouse or ex-spouse, and claims where 
the persecutor is involved in other sorts of criminal activity .
Although RPD adjudicators are taking note of whether 
there is protective legislation in the majority of the cases, 
this finding cannot stand in for an analysis of whether the 
state is in practice willing and able to protect women from 
domestic violence . “The potential of laws on violence against 
women remain unfulfilled if they are not effectively applied 
and enforced .”43
A related trend is that evidence that protective laws exist 
is always given weight in assessing whether the presumption 
of state protection was rebutted . However, in the three cases 
where no laws that criminalized or made domestic violence 
actionable existed, the presumption of state protection was 
still not rebutted . Such evidence does not seem to attract 
any weight . This raises the spectre that some adjudicators 
are being selective in their use of country report evidence, 
instead of fair-handed .
RPD Adjudicators Are Selective in Giving Weight to Police 
Responsiveness to Domestic Violence Victims . There is a sim-
ilar pattern of inconsistency in terms of adjudicators consid-
ering documented police attitudes towards women who seek 
protection . Although some adjudicators observed whether 
police were usually responsive, or reluctant to assist domes-
tic violence victims, in 60 per cent of the decisions there 
was no consideration whatsoever of documented police atti-
tudes towards women who sought protection from domestic 
violence . It is impossible to assess whether a claimant acted 
reasonably in not seeking police protection if the adjudica-
tor does not consider whether the police are likely to refuse 
to assist the claimant . However, in 60 per cent of the cases 
where the presumption of state protection was not rebutted, 
this unwarranted jump in logic was made .
In the claims where documentary evidence on police atti-
tudes to alleged victims of domestic violence was considered, 
adjudicators found that police were usually responsive in 23 
per cent of cases and reluctant to intervene in 31 .5 per cent 
of cases; they also found there were radically different docu-
mented conclusions on police attitudes in 14 per cent of the 
cases . In several of the cases (34 per cent), the adjudicator 
found that police attitudes were improving, but provided 
no assessment of whether the police were in fact actually 
responsive: the fact of improvement seemed to stand in for 
a conclusion on this point . This could suggest that adjudi-
cators were basing their assessment on the “good will” of 
states, not whether women were protected . In all five of the 
cases where there was radically contradictory evidence on 
police attitudes, the adjudicators preferred the evidence that 
police were responsive, effectively finding the claimant’s own 
undisputed evidence in three of these five cases that their own 
attempts to seek police assistance had been rebuffed to have 
no weight .
* RPD decisions reported in LexisNexis Quicklaw, 2004–2009 (as 
of April 2010), where the claim was declined on grounds which 
included the presumption of state protection not being rebutted .
* This chart represents RPD decisions in cases where the pre-
sumption of state protection was not rebutted . (N= 86 .) Cases 
reported on LexisNexis Quicklaw, 2004–2009 .
Chart 5: Observations on legislation that  
criminalizes or makes domestic  
violence actionable*
Chart 6: RPD Observations on police  
responsiveness to women seeking protection  
from domestic violence (2004–2009)* (N=86)
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In practice, where police were documented as being 
responsive, this was taken as evidence that the presumption 
of state protection was not rebutted . However, when police 
were documented as not being responsive, or as “improv-
ing,” or where there was some evidence of a lack of respon-
siveness, this documentary evidence does not appear to have 
carried any weight in the decision that the state could protect . 
This is despite the fact that police attitudes are one of the 
factors that the UN identifies as causing otherwise adequate 
protection regimes to offer ineffective protection in practice .
The trend in some RPD decisions to selectively draw 
upon positive evidence of state protection—and to ignore 
contrary evidence—is also commented on in judicial review 
decisions . These are discussed below .
RPD Adjudicators Do Not Appear to Treat Social or Cultural 
Factors as Relevant for Determining If It Was Reasonable for 
the Claimant to Not Seek State Protection . The negative deci-
sions were also reviewed to see what part social or cultural 
factors played in finding the presumption of state protec-
tion was not rebutted . In particular, they were flagged if and 
when the adjudicator cited documentary evidence in their 
decision or when he/she made statements about the follow-
ing social or cultural contextual issues:
•	 if there were cultural or societal attitudes of violence 
against women
•	 any observations on how cultural or social norms 
relate to risks of domestic violence
•	 whether domestic violence was a “serious” or “wide-
spread” problem
•	 whether domestic violence is considered a “private 
matter” or “family affair” or source of shame
•	 whether women were reluctant to report (or did not 
report) domestic violence
•	 whether the claimant alleged police apathy or reluc-
tance to act, as well as the claimant’s own experiences 
in seeking police assistance .
Of the 86 decisions that were reported from 2004 to 2009 
where a ground for declining the claim was that the presump-
tion of state protection was not rebutted, the adjudicator only 
considered if there were cultural or societal attitudes of vio-
lence towards women, or whether domestic violence was 
considered a “private matter” or “family affair” in 17 cases, 
a mere 20 per cent of decisions . (See Chart 7 .) Most of these 
cases were released in 2004 (8 cases) and 2005 (5 cases) .
Although in the majority of cases there was some sort of 
comment about domestic violence being prevalent in the 
woman’s home state, this observation never seemed to carry 
any weight for assessing state protection . One would think 
that if domestic violence was found to be a “serious” and 
“widespread problem” that this evidence would go some 
way towards rebutting the presumption of state protection . 
However, these observations do not appear to be taken as 
relevant in the final analysis .
Where adjudicators drew in other social or cultural fac-
tors—which they did at a very low rate—these too did not 
seem to affect the assessment of whether it was reasonable 
for the claimant to have assumed that their state would not 
protect them and so did not seek state protection, or failed 
to continue to pursue police protection in the face of having 
their requests for assistance rebuffed by police officers .
Given that most adjudicators made at least a minimal 
reference to societal conditions, it is clear that most under-
stand the need to draw upon these factors . They do not, 
however, appear to know how to use the information—or to 
know what information is relevant—in making their deci-
sion . The problem is perhaps one of training and support . 
RPD adjudicators cannot be assumed to be sociologists or 
political scientists—the jump between identifying socio-
cultural data and actually determining its legal relevance is 
not an easy leap to make . However, if the Guidelines are to 
be respected, and taken as good guidance for determining 
gendered claims, then this gap must be closed .
Recommendation: RPD adjudicators be specifically trained and 
supported in understanding the relevance of socio-cultural fac-
tors for assessing the reasonableness of women not seeking—or 
failing to seek with persistence—police assistance .
Economic and Religious Factors Do Not Appear to Be Taken 
Meaningfully into Account . As well as directing adjudicators 
to consider how social and cultural factors are relevant for 
determining whether it is reasonable for a claimant to seek 
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consider economic and religious factors . Religious factors 
were not mentioned in any of the 86 decisions .
As to economic factors, a few were referred to briefly in 
fewer than half of the decisions . In particular, in 38 of the 
86 decisions (44 per cent), adjudicators identified whether 
or not there were shelters in the claimant’s home state for 
women fleeing domestic violence . However, identifying the 
existence of shelters tended to be the end of the analysis . 
There were only 13 decisions where the adjudicator referred to 
documentary material on adequacy . In all of these cases, the 
adjudicator found that either there were no shelters or that 
the shelters were very insufficient to meet demand . However, 
these findings—that women may have no where else to go—
appeared to have played no role in the conclusion that the 
claimant ought to have sought (or sought more aggressively) 
police intervention .
The UN Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women has specifically expressed concern over 
women’s shelters in signatory states being inadequately 
financed and their operations unmonitored .44 One cannot 
assume that the reported existence of shelters translates into 
shelters that are operating and effective .
Also of note is the tendency of adjudicators to discuss 
the existence of private or NGO shelters, or shelters oper-
ated by international aid agencies, within their discussion 
of whether there is evidence of state protection, even though 
it is obvious that such private or international initiatives 
most like arise due to a lack of state shelters . This confla-
tion of state initiatives with non-state initiatives is mislead-
ing and distorts the analysis of state protection . The Gender 
Guidelines specifically address this issue, and so apparently 
are once again not being followed .
Recommendation: In assessing state protection, RPD adjudica-
tors be cautioned to follow the Gender Guidelines and distinguish 
between protective measures that the state offers, and those which 
are provided by non-state entities .
There was little consideration of any other economic cir-
cumstances which may be relevant in assessing whether it 
is objectively unreasonable for the claimant to have sought 
state protection through police intervention . The only other 
example of note is that in a few decisions, the adjudicator 
referred to country documents that indicated women were 
economically dependent on men . This was described as 
part of the general context in 5 of the 86 cases, but appeared 
to have no impact on the analysis of state protection . In the 
remaining 81 cases no consideration whatsoever was given to 
how economic considerations may impact on the behaviour 
of abused women, and the analysis of whether it is object-
ively unreasonable for them to seek state protection .
In one case,45 the claimant put forward economic evi-
dence as to why she had only sought police protection 
44%
66%
Chart 8: RPD 
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Chart 9: If RPD observed 
shelters exist,  observaons 
on adequacy
intermittently, and had also continually returned to her 
abusive spouse over a twenty-four-year period . Her uncon-
tested evidence was that she returned—and did not seek 
much police intervention—because she could not support 
her children by herself . Her evidence was also that her 
family refused to provide her with food and housing, and 
told her instead to return to her spouse . We see here how 
societal attitudes and economic needs impact on women’s 
ability to take action . Although the adjudicator observed 
the woman behaved in accordance with housing needs, he 
nonetheless found the claimant “failed to make a diligent 
effort to obtain state protection,” and so the presumption of 
state protection was not rebutted . The adjudicator did not 
consider how the claimant could survive without the spouse 
that she was dependent upon, or where she was to live .
Chart 8: RPD observations  
on whether shelters exist*
Chart 9: If RPD observed shelters exist,  
observations on adequacy*
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As mentioned above, there were five cases included in 
the review where adjudicators made general links between 
economic factors and how abused women may behave . For 
example, adjudicators referred to documentary evidence 
that women were reluctant to seek the prosecution of their 
abusive spouses due to financial dependence upon those 
spouses . Adjudicators also observed that even when the 
state issued protection orders, country condition reports 
indicated that women would let their spouses back into 
the family home—and not report the violation of these 
orders—due to financial dependence upon their spouses .46 
However, these careful and sensitive observations about 
how economic dependency affect abused women’s decisions 
about seeking state protection did not seem to play a role 
in assessing whether the women had acted “reasonably” in 
their decision to not seek state protection, or to not seek fur-
ther assistance to exclude their abusive husbands when they 
re-entered the family home .
Recommendation: RPD adjudicators be trained and supported 
in understanding how a claimant’s economic and religious con-
text may be legally relevant for assessing the reasonableness of 
women not seeking—or failing to seek with persistence—police 
assistance . In particular, adjudicators should receive direction on 
how economic dependency may restrict women’s ability to leave a 
violent relationship, and to be able to meet basic economic needs 
if their male spouse is removed from the home .
Snapshot: An Example from Grenada . In the unsuccessful 
2006 claim of Lewis v . Canada (MCI)47 there was a major-
ity and a dissenting set of reasons . The decision turned on 
whether it was reasonable for the claimant to have failed to 
go to the police, and the majority and dissent part on the 
relevance of social and economic factors . Although both 
observed that shelters existed, only the dissenting adjudica-
tor considered the actual availability of shelters . Similarly, 
only the dissenting adjudicator referred to evidence on how 
financial dependency plays into the ability of women in the 
claimant’s position to pursue charges . The claimant also 
gave evidence of other women whose attempts to seek police 
protection had been rebuffed, and stated she believed her ex-
partner would carry out his threat to kill her if she went to 
the police . Given the economic, social, and policing context, 
the dissenting adjudicator found it was not unreasonable 
for the claimant to not seek police protection . The majority 
panel, however, rejected her claim . They wrote:
Essentially the claimant cites social and cultural norms as the rea-
son why she had repeatedly failed to seek police assistance . In this 
instance, the Board cannot find fault with the security forces or 
legal system when the claimant was unwilling to avail herself of 
these services . Based on the information before the Board, then 
the objective basis of the claim fails .48
The majority explicitly and blatantly failed to follow the 
directions in the Gender Guidelines . They correctly identi-
fied that they were being asked to consider how the social 
and cultural context affected the reasonableness of the 
claimant failing to seek state protection . However, they 
refused to engage in the required analysis . It appears that 
they did not understand how it could be legally relevant . The 
majority commented a second time on these broader con-
textual factors in their concluding comments on state pro-
tection . They wrote:
[The police] cannot offer help if they are unaware of the transgres-
sions . The historical situation in Grenada for abused females sug-
gests the system failed for two reasons: 1) police and legal disinter-
est, and 2) a failure on the part of victims to report abuse, due to 
their dependency on males for economic survival .49
The majority found the first reason (police disinterest) had 
been gradually addressed . However, they made no comment 
about whether the second reason (economic survival) still 
persisted . So although the majority clearly linked women’s 
failure to seek police protection to restrictions created by 
social and economic norms, the majority nonetheless failed 
to consider whether “economic survival” would make it 
reasonable for a woman to fail to seek police assistance . 
The failure to consider the relevant of gendered economic 
dependency once again resulted in the de-gendering of the 
analysis .
Recommendation: The IRB ensure RPD adjudicators are trained 
in how social, cultural, economic, and religious factors can be rel-
evant for assessing whether the presumption of state protection 
has been rebutted .
* Chart reflects RPD decisions that were reported in LexisNexis 
Quicklaw (2004–2009), as of April 2010, where one ground on 
which the claim was dismissed was that the presumption of state 
protection was not rebutted .
Chart 10: RPD observations on gender and  
economic dependency* (N=86)
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Trend: RPD Adjudicators May Be Insensitive to How Women 
May Behave If They Are Victims of Spousal Violence
The Gender Guidelines explicitly flag the fact that “[w]omen 
who have been subjected to domestic violence may exhibit 
a pattern of symptoms referred to as Battered Woman 
Syndrome …” The Guidelines refer to the Supreme Court 
of Canada decision, R v . Lavallee,50 for understanding how 
abused women may behave . The Guidelines include the fol-
lowing quote from Lavallee:
[the myth is that e]ither she was not as badly beaten as 
she claims, or she would have left the man long ago . Or, if 
she was battered that severely, she must have stayed out of 
some masochistic enjoyment of it .
This quote highlights two “myths” about abused women 
that adjudicators must be careful to avoid . The first myth is 
to conclude that any woman who alleges that she stayed in 
an abusive relationship must be lying . The second myth is 
to conclude that if the woman was not lying, then the abuse 
was not actually experienced by her as abusive, and there-
fore does not deserve recognition as abuse, or to be other-
wise recognized as legally relevant .
The Gender Guidelines go on to point out that one of the 
manifestations of Battered Woman Syndrome is that the 
abused women is “reluctant” to disclose the existence of 
the abuse . In the Lavallee case, the woman who was found 
to suffer from Battered Woman Syndrome demonstrated 
this pattern by failing to seek police assistance and by lying 
to doctors about the source of her injuries . The Supreme 
Court cautioned that in the case of abused women, such 
inaction and/or deceit should not necessarily impugn the 
credibility of their delayed claim of abuse, or their general 
credibility .
Several cases illustrate adjudicators buying into and dis-
missing claims based on these myths, instead of identify-
ing and rejecting them . Some of the language from these 
cases is highlighted in the box below . It is clear from these 
extracts that adjudicators may see women as making choices 
to permit abuse to continue: either through remaining in a 
relationship or else by failing to go to police . In either case 
the implication is that their situation is their own fault—and 
therefore the woman is unworthy of asylum .
Snapshot: Wrongful Assumptions about the “Reasonable” 
Abused Woman .
•	 [she] “has made no serious efforts to break off the 
relationship”51
•	 “she might have been an abused wife but she never did 
anything to help herself”52
•	 “… together with the fact that she went back to him 
in 2002, is hardly a vigourous pursuit of protection”53
•	 “It is not sufficient to go to the police only on one occa-
sion and then to abdicate her responsibility by not 
reporting the [subsequent] alleged threats”54
•	 “In terms of tools available to women who are victims 
of violence, the panel might add … that there is a 
divorce law allowing spouses to end their relationship 
once and for all”55
•	 “it has to be noted that the claimant’s erratic relation-
ship with the perpetrator always ended in the claimant 
reconciling with him .”56
•	 “Three rapes, six moves and the loss of three jobs due 
to the behaviour of her assailant, xxxx xxxxx, did not 
convince the claimant to lay a complaint or to seek 
help or assistance from the police or a women’s right’s 
organization in Costa Rica because, according to her, 
protection in that country takes a long time to obtain 
and is unreliable . She also feared that xxxxx would be 
imprisoned for two months and then get out of jail, 
kill her and then commit suicide: this became her 
excuse for not availing herself of the protection of the 
Costa Rican authorities”57
•	 “… she backed away from pursuing the charges because 
xxxxx said he was going to kill her … Because she 
refused to press charges the claimant did not fully dis-
charge her obligation to seek state protection”58
The matters of RPD adjudicator assessments of credibil-
ity and what sort of behaviour one can reasonably expect of 
women who have been abused by their spouses are taken 
up again later in this report . In particular, section 3(c) pre-
sents information on how often RPD decisions are found to 
be unreasonable due to the adjudicator’s assessment of the 
claimant’s credibility .
Recommendation: That the IRB work to better sensitize RPD 
adjudicators to the myths of domestic violence; In particular, to 
develop their understanding of what is “reasonable” or expect-
able behaviour for abused women, including remaining in or 
returning to abusive relationships and failing to seek police or 
medical assistance .
Judicial Reviews of RPD Decisions Confirm Disturbing 
Trends
The Judicial Review Rate for Negative PRD Decisions  
on Domestic Violence Claims Is 44 Per Cent
RPD decisions are usually expected to stand . RPD adjudica-
tors are presumed to possess specialized expertise . They are 
also seen as best placed to assess many aspects of the evidence 
and, of course, the credibility of the claimant . Nevertheless, 
an unsuccessful claimant may bring an application to the 
Federal Court, seeking to have a decision judicially reviewed . 
Any judicial review of factual findings—such as whether a 
claimant’s state can protect her, or whether the claimant’s 
story was credible—will be performed with considerable 
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deference to the adjudicator’s judgment . Such findings are 
reviewed against a standard of “reasonableness .” This stan-
dard is met when the “decision falls within the range of pos-
sible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect 
of the facts and law .”59 The reviewing judge centrally asks 
whether the RPD adjudicator justified their decision, and 
whether the reasons are transparent and intelligible . So 
decisions stand where they are “defensible,” and one can 
see how they were reached—not because a reviewing judge 
finds that they were correct, or because the reviewing judge 
would have made the same decision . On the other hand, 
where the claimant argues that the RPD adjudicator made 
a legal or process error—such as applying the wrong legal 
test or acting unfairly—the reviewing judge will ask if the 
adjudicator got these matters right .
A review of the LexisNexis Quicklaw Federal Court 
database from 2005 to 2009 reveals that there were 89 
judicial reviews for negative RPD decisions where the 
claimant was fleeing domestic violence . (See Chart 11 .) On 
average, for this five-year period, a shocking 44 per cent of 
these reviews were allowed . That is, in 39 of the 89 reported 
decisions, the Federal Court found that the RPD adjudica-
tor either had the law or an element of procedural fairness 
wrong, or else had reached indefensible conclusions on 
factual matters .
Canada’s self-proclaimed (and commendable) policy on 
refugee hearings is that the “system focuses on getting the 
decision right at the first level, with highly qualified and 
well-trained decision-makers …”60 The judicial review rate 
indicates that RPD adjudicators are not meeting Canada’s 
policy objectives . Intervention is clearly required .
Federal Court Judges Condemn Some RPD Decisions  
for Only Giving Weight to Country Reports That Indicate  
a Woman’s Home State Is Safe
The reasons for permitting judicial reviews in these cases 
are also troubling . In 77 per cent of the cases, the reviewing 
judge allowed the judicial review on a basis that the adjudi-
cator’s finding on state protection did not meet the reason-
ableness standard . (See Chart 12 .) In the majority of cases, 
this was because the adjudicator failed to address evidence 
that was placed before him or her that the state could not 
protect the claimant . That is, in assessing whether the pre-
sumption of protection was rebutted, the adjudicator did not 
consider the presented evidence showing that the woman’s 
state could not protect her .
Often the Federal Court judge’s description of why the 
adjudicator’s decision was not defensible is presented in a 
fairly neutral fashion . For example, in one case the judge 
simply wrote: “The RPD failed to explain its selective reli-
ance upon the documentary evidence and specifically failed 
to deal with the evidence that directly contradicted its find-
ing that protection was available to women in Mexico .” 61
However, the frustration of the Federal Court with the 
assessments of state protection by RPD adjudicators is in 
some instances quite palpable . For example, in a 2009 case 
where a reviewing judge found the RPD assessment that 
St . Vincent and Grenadines could protect a claimant from 
domestic violence was unreasonable, the judge wrote:62
5 Taken at its face value, the decision appears to be reasonable . 
This Court is supposed to show deference to the RPD panels who 
allegedly have greater expertise in country conditions than the 
Court itself . However there comes a time when it becomes obvious 
that deference should be earned, particularly when the Panel appar-
ently pays no attention to the cases coming out of this Court which 
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specifically deal with St . Vincent and the Grenadines . The analysis 
of country conditions was clearly a pro-forma one, or what Madam 
Justice Snider called in Alvandi v . Canada (Minister of Citizenship 
and Immigration), 2009 FC 790, a “cookie-cutter analysis .”
6 This Court does not sit in a de novo appeal and so cannot do its 
own country analysis…  .
7 …  . there are a great number of cases where judicial review has 
been granted on the basis that findings that there is state protec-
tion in St . Vincent and Grenadines were unreasonable . Without 
putting too fine a line on it, many of the women appear to have 
been in generally similar situations . See for instance: [list of eight 
cases where judicial review was allowed on state protection]
There are many other cases where the Federal Court sim-
ilarly found the RPD adjudicator had selectively relied only 
upon the evidence that the state could protect, and failed to 
meaningfully engage with evidence that demonstrated the 
claimant’s home state could not protect her .63
Reviewing Judges Find RPD Assessments of Credibility May 
Rest on False Assumptions about Domestic Abuse
Perhaps even more surprising are the judicial reviews 
that were allowed on the basis of the adjudicator mak-
ing unreasonable conclusions about the credibility of the 
woman’s story . Credibility was the second most frequent 
reason in the studied decisions for the RPD to decline 
claims, at 34 per cent . An RPD adjudicator’s assessment of 
claimant credibility may turn on the adjudicator’s under-
standing about what is not reasonable behaviour for an 
abused woman . For example, in one case64 a woman’s 
claim that she was abused by her spouse was disbelieved 
by the RPD adjudicator in part because she had remained 
in her home with her alleged abuser for a year after receiv-
ing a visa to travel to Canada . The reviewing judge found 
the RPD’s conclusion on credibility to be unreasonable, 
writing:
the Board’s curt dismissal of the Applicant’s explanation [for 
remaining in the home] suggests that is [sic] was inconceivable 
that the Applicant would remain in an abusive relationship for 
any good reason and the fact that she did so must mean she is 
not telling the truth . The Supreme Court addressed implications 
such as these in relation to women suffering ongoing abuse in 
R . v . Lavallée, [1990] 1 S .C .R . 852, which is cited in the Gender 
Guidelines; in that case, this kind of implication was described 
as part of the “mythology about domestic violence .” This is 
another clear example of how the Board failed to apply the Gender 
Guidelines in a meaningful way .
Similar comments are scattered through the judicial review 
decisions, of judges determining that credibility findings 
were unreasonable because they were based on claimants 
being unable to explain why they stayed in an allegedly abu-
sive relationship, or why their spouse had become violent 
toward them .65 The observations in these cases marry with 
the conclusions reached above in the discussion of RPD 
adjudicators being insensitive to how abused women may 
behave . This problem is clearly one of education, of sup-
porting adjudicators to develop a better understanding of 
how behaviour which may otherwise seem incredible is in 
fact not unusual or unreasonable for a woman in an abusive 
spousal relationship .
Reviewing Judges Often Link RPD Errors to a Failure  
to Follow the Gender Guidelines
In one-third of the cases where the judicial review was 
allowed, the reviewing judge observed that the adjudicator 
had failed to follow and apply the Gender Guidelines . This 
failure, in turn, was typically linked to why the adjudicator’s 
conclusion on credibility or state protection was unreason-
able . This suggests that, if the Gender Guidelines are actually 
considered and properly applied, then decision making will 
improve and the judicial review rate may drop .
Recommendation: The IRB undertake an aggressive review of 
their training and support programs for RPD adjudicators hear-
ing gender-based claims . There should be an emphasis on the 
areas which are regularly raising concerns with the Federal Court . 
These include receiving and assessing the credibility of testimony 
from persons who may have been victims of domestic abuse, and 
the necessity to assess all relevant evidence regarding state protec-
tion—not just evidence that the state can protect .
Recommendation: The IRB deliver a revised training and support 
system for RPD adjudicators for assessing gender-based claims .
Recommendation: The IRB track, analyze, and publish data on 
positive and negative trends identified through judicial reviews of 
its decisions on domestic-violence-based claims .
Recommendation: Trends identified through judicial reviews be 
used to identify where more direction is needed in the Gender 
Guidelines, and where adjudicators need more training and 
support .
Concluding Comments
The Guidelines receive inconsistent treatment by adjudi-
cators . Although adjudicators properly assess domestic or 
intimate violence to be a form of persecution, the gendered 
analysis is often lost when it comes to assessing state pro-
tection . In particular, adjudicators tend to conflate the fact 
that states have enacted protective legislation with the find-
ing that there is protection for the claimant . RPD adjudica-
tors also seem to fail to meaningfully engage with how the 
social, cultural, economic, and policing context are relevant 
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for evaluating how abused women may be able to engage 
with the state apparatus and policing services .
Given the rates at which domestic violence claims have 
been dismissed by the RPD (almost 100 per cent in the 
study set), the consistently high rates of successful judicial 
reviews over the past five years (averaging 44 per cent in 
the reviewed cases), and the scathing commentary on some 
RPD assessments of state protection and claimant credibility, 
as well as observations on the failure to follow the Gender 
Guidelines, it appears that many RPD adjudicators have not 
been adequately trained and supported to make reasonable 
decisions on claims involving domestic violence . These find-
ings would seem to indicate that it is more likely than not 
that Canada is indeed returning women to danger .
This report does not assert any conclusions about whether 
Canada would better meet its protection obligations if it was 
to amend the refugee definition to explicitly include “gender” 
as a ground of persecution . However, it does show an express 
need for adjudicators to receive better training for hearing 
gendered claims, and that the Gender Guidelines themselves 
require considerable revision if they are to serve as an effect-
ive tool for assisting adjudicators . Pivotally, revisions are 
required to bring them in line with contemporary human 
rights instruments, and to provide better and more ful-
some direction on a number of issues, such as how adjudica-
tors are to use social and economic norms in their assess-
ments of state protection . This indicates the pressing need 
for the Guidelines to not merely be revised on an issue-by-
issue basis, but to be put through a general review process . 
Obviously, after such a review (and revisioning), there needs 
to be a process in place to ensure that the Gender Guidelines 
are regularly revisited . Given the findings of this report, they 
ought to be regularly reviewed for revisions both to reflect 
changing norms and law, as well as to reflect areas where 
adjudicators are found to need more direction .
Recommendation: The Gender Guidelines be put through a com-
prehensive review to revise them to reflect contemporary law and 
norms, and to provide better guidance in the areas where RPD 
decisions seem to falter .
Recommendation: CIC instantiate a process for reviewing and 
revising the Gender Guidelines on an on-going basis .
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